Today the Supreme Court of Canada issued its decision in R. v. Bissonnette, which was a constitutional challenge to a section of Canada's Criminal Code that allowed for the imposition of "stacked" life sentences. The mandatory sentence for first degree murder in Canada is life without a possibility of parole for 25 years, but s. 745.51 allowed for these periods of parole ineligibility to be imposed consecutively; so a person convicted of two first-degree murders would not be eligible for parole for 50 years, a conviction for three would see parole ineligibility for 75 years, and so on. As the Court's judgment pointed out, the minimum prison sentence imposed under the section is 50 years without parole, and given that a sentence of this length completely impairs a person's re-entry into society, this is essentially a sentence of "life without parole."
I will leave detailed commentary for others, but the main point here is that the Court unanimously (in a period when they are often divided) struck down this provision as unconstitutional, specifically because it breaches the protection against cruel and unusual punishment in s. 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Court's judgment, written by Chief Justice Wagner, unambiguously holds that such a punishment is violative of the most basic standards of human rights law and the law of criminal sanction. From early in the judgment:
A sentence of imprisonment for life without a realistic possibility of parole is intrinsically incompatible with human dignity. Such a sentence is degrading insofar as it negates, in advance and irreversibly, the penological objective of rehabilitation. This objective is intimately linked to human dignity in that it conveys the conviction that every individual is capable of repenting and re‑entering society. This conclusion that a sentence of imprisonment for life without a realistic possibility of parole is incompatible with human dignity is not only reinforced by the effects that such a sentence may have on all offenders on whom it is imposed, but also finds support in international and comparative law. (para. 8)
It is notable as well that the Court made its finding of invalidity retroactive to the moment the provision was brought in, which will have implications for the (very few) offenders who are currently imprisoned under this regime.
For my purposes here, the interesting point is the effect that this ruling will have on Canada's extradition law (I have blogged about this here). On a number of occasions, Canadian courts have been content to allow the government to extradite offenders to face a sentence of life without parole in a foreign state (always, I believe, the U.S.). It would seem logical -- in fact, inevitable -- that this practice should stop immediately; the International Assistance Group (Justice Canada's specialized department that conducts extradition cases) should immediately advise all of Canada's extradition partners that we will no longer extradite to face a sentence of this sort. It is worthwhile recalling that in 2001 the Court ruled that extradition to face the death penalty was a breach of the Charter, given that Canada and much of the world had abolished it. A similar logic should prevail here.
It is highly arguable that all such extraditions were unconstitutional to begin with, despite the court findings, but to date the SCC has not weighed in on whether extradition to face life without parole complies with the Charter. With any luck, Justice Canada will face directly the point that life without parole is completely inimical to contemporary human rights standards, and change their practices now. Surely this point should not have to be litigated.
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